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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the effects of the Kribi Deep
Seaport project will be positive for economic development in Cameroon, and how the
Port will affect Cameroon’s regional and global role. The study was conducted over a
one-month period and was primarily qualitative in nature. The principal method of
inquiry was interviews, which were complemented by quantitative secondary source
research. Although most informants asserted that the project was a positive step for the
country, the information they provided led me to conclude that the project was
undertaken prematurely and will not promote sustainable economic development in
Cameroon. There were several findings that led me to this conclusion. First, the lack of
adequate educational infrastructure in the country, excluding most Cameroonians from
taking advantage of the employment opportunities generated. Second, the lack of
transparency and the demonstrated inability of the government to effectively utilize
revenues, meaning that natural resource wealth would be wasted. The final result that led
to my conclusion was the negative implications of the expansion of the relationship with
China that the Port entails. Ultimately, the Port is a good project in principle, but the
current circumstances will nullify the potential benefits.
Résumé
Le but de ce projet était de déterminer si les effets du Port en Eau Profonde a
Kribi seront positifs pour le développement économique du Cameroun, et comment le
Port va changer le rôle du Cameroun régionalement et globalement. L’étude était fait
pendant un mois et c’était principalement qualitatif. La méthode principale était les
entretiens, qui étaient complémentés par les ressources secondaires quantitatifs. Malgré le
fait que la plupart des participants pensaient que le Port sera une bonne chose pour le
pays, l’information qu’ils m’ont donnés a indiqué que le Port ne va pas promouvoir le
développement durable du Cameroun. Il y a trois faits principaux qui supportent cette
conclusion. En premier lieu, il y a l’absence d’une infrastructure de formation
professionnelle au Cameroun, qui excluent la plupart des Camerounais de tirer profit des
emplois que seront générés. Deuxièmement, il y a le manque de transparence et
l’incapacite du gouvernement d’utiliser convenablement les recettes. Le dernier fait qui
appuie ma conclusion et les impacts négatifs de la relation croissante avec le Chine, que
le Port encouragera. Enfin le Port est un bon projet en principe, mais les circonstances qui
existent au Cameroun vont détruire les bénéfices potentiels.
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I. Introduction
Key Terms & Background
The most important term to understand for this study is what a “deep sea port”
consists of, and how it differs from a regular port. Cameroon already has the Port of
Douala, which receives heavy regional and global traffic. However, because this is an
estuary Port it has to be dredged every year in order for even moderately large ships to
dock. Many ships cannot enter at all, which means they have to anchor offshore while
their contents are ferried to the Port.1 In contrast, the Port currently being built in Kribi
will be capable of accepting the largest ships in the world. Additionally, the Kribi Deep
Sea Port Complex is planned as more than just a maritime center, but also an entire
industrial complex and city. Light rail, roads, agro-industry, and research and
development are among the many projects to be undertaken. The Port Complex Master
Plan also describes the plans for an entirely modern residential city, intended to grow
around the Port industrial areas.2 Officials project that this residential community will
exceed 100,000 inhabitants by 2040.3
Given the extensive nature of this project, Cameroon lacked the funds and
technical expertise to take it on alone. Although they had initially collaborated with
France, when Europe was hard hit by the financial crisis in 2008 France no longer had the
means to fund it. Cameroon then turned to the East, and in 2008 the government agreed
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Royal Haskoning. “Spatial Master Plan.” March 2012. p. 13.
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to a 207 billion CFA concessionary loan with the Chinese Export-Import (EXIM) Bank
to finance the project. A Chinese company, China Harbour Engineering Corporation
(CHEC), was designated by EXIM bank to preform the pre-construction studies and the
construction itself. A U.S.-based construction consultancy, Louis Berger, won the
contract for the technical assistance and supervisory role. The odd aspect of this project is
that the same company, CHEC, preformed both the initial studies and the construction.
Normally, an outside group performs all pre-construction studies, to determine everything
from environmental impacts to what the thickness of the concrete in the walkways should
be. The construction company then follows those plans under the guidance and inspection
of the technical assistant group. In this case the Chinese company is following plans that
they drew up themselves, so checks and balances have been limited.4
The Port is scheduled to accept the first ship in 2014, and there are numerous
stakeholders that have plans for how the Port will be used. United States enterprises are
hoping to exploit Cameroon’s rich oil resources, joining the French company GDF-Suez
that already has a contract for extraction near the Port. 5 CamIron, an affiliate of the
Austrialian Company Sundance resources, is planning to build a railway between their
iron-mining site and the Port, and handle all their exports through Kribi. The Port will be
a hub of trade for the entire region, and will also serve Chad and the Central African
Republic. In the current port of Douala each of these countries has its own terminal, but
so far the logistics of dividing the Kribi Port have yet to be determined.6 Yet even a
minister from nearby oil-exporter Equatorial Guinea has purportedly visited Cameroon to
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discuss a stake in the Port. All initial signs indicate that the Kribi Port will indeed become
a crowded hub of international commerce.
Yet for many Cameroonians, the Kribi Deep Sea Port remains a vague concept
with no visible link to their lives. In a country where 30 percent of the population lives on
less than two dollars a day, and 29 percent are illiterate,7 big infrastructure has minimal
significance for many citizens. However, according to Paul Biya’s Vision 2035 goals, the
“grands realisations” big infrastructure projects that the government is undertaking will
improve the lives of Cameroonians at every socioeconomic level. As the focal point of
the “grands realisations” strategy, the Kribi Deep Sea Port is the linchpin of the Vision
2035 goals.8 These goals include reducing poverty to less than 10 percent by 2035, and
increasing the economic growth rate to 10 percent by 2017.9 It may seem incongruous to
build a multi-million dollar Port complex in a country where many people lack access to
clean water and adequate medical resources. Yet in theory these projects will attract
foreign investment in those areas, provide funds to the government to serve the
population, and give Cameroonians the skills needed to spearhead these projects
domestically. This chain of events is intended to elevate Cameroon to middle-income
country status by 2035.
The Kribi Port is not set to open its berths until 2014, so it is impossible to determine
the full extent of the impacts at this point. However, several micro-level impacts are
already clear. Local populations are being displaced to make room for the Port, and
though they are receiving compensation to relocate, many of them have protested that
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they cannot adjust to life in a city, nor do they have the skills to find work there. This is
particularly poignant in the case of the indigenous Bagyeli population, a forest dwelling
people who have lived off hunting and gathering in the area for hundreds of years. A
heavily traveled gravel construction road to the Port has been built right alongside a
Bagyeli camp. They watch with interest as the trucks roll by, because they have not yet
realized that the ever-increasing noise and pollution is driving out the animals that they
rely on for their livelihood.10 Many fishermen in the area will also be forced to turn to
other trades, and the biodiversity of the region, including the nearby Campo-Ma’an
national park, will suffer.11 Kribi city is expected to become about five times larger than
it currently is.12 With that comes increased crime, as well as a sense of anonymity that
some long-time Kribi residents I spoke with have already begun to notice.
After that introduction, it may seem that my mind is made up about the Port project.
Yet the aspects discussed above are not the impacts this study examines in depth, because
the negative impacts at the local and environmental level are already clear. With any
huge undertaking like the Port, there will be upheaval in the local community, and things
will be lost. Spending time with affected populations and hearing their stories would have
been an incredible experience, but focusing on their stories alone would be ignoring the
full story. Thus, my research focuses primarily on the macro-level economic impacts of
the Port. The purpose of the inquiry was to determine whether the micro-level negatives
are negligible when compared to the greater good that the Port will do for the country and
the region. This is a question that has been largely unexplored, except in black and white
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terms by various promoters and detractors of the Port. This paper will attempt to offer a
unbiased picture of how the Port will impact economic development in Cameroon.
Research Questions & Hypotheses
My initial research led me to focus my inquiry on two questions:
1. Will the Kribi Deep Sea Port contribute positively to sustainable economic
development in Cameroon?
2. How will the Kribi Deep Sea Port project impact Cameroon’s trade relationships
with CEMAC countries and foreign partners?
Hypothesis 1: It will bring increased revenues to the state, and provide some
employment, but ultimately will not create sustainable development. The Port project will
focus the economy on sectors that are infamously corrupt and unsustainable, thus most
Cameroonian citizens are unlikely to feel the effects of the revenues it generates.
Hypothesis 2: Relationships among the CEMAC countries will be largely unchanged,
because although they will all use the Port, the focus will be on exporting their goods
abroad, not trading with one another. I think the Port will give China and the United
States the opportunity to exploit Cameroonian resources, while contributing
comparatively little to the domestic economy.
II. Methodology
Site & Subject Selection
My site selection process was straightforward. It was important to spend time in
both Kribi and Yaoundé, because it was crucial to see the actual construction site and
speak to employees there. Yet given that the project is primarily directed from Yaoundé,
it was equally important to talk to the relevant government agencies, embassies, NGOs,
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and professors in the capital. Spending 2.5 weeks in Yaoundé and 1.5 weeks in Kribi
gave me enough time to accomplish my goals in each area. My Yaoundé interviews took
about 1.5 weeks, because there was minimal adjustment time given my previous
familiarity with my homestay family, the city, and transportation. In Kribi, it took several
days to orient myself and figure out logistics, followed by a week of interviews and
observation.
Subject selection was more complicated, and it was a process that continued
throughout my research. My target population was people with knowledge and opinions
relevant to the Kribi Port Project, which included individuals from a variety of fields.
Using “expert” informants made my research more difficult in some respects but easier in
others. On the negative side, it was often difficult to gain access to these people, as they
had busy schedules and limited free time. Others were simply not interested in talking
because they were worried about revealing privileged information to a researcher. It was
sometimes difficult to establish rapport and gain trust because of the sensitive nature of
the subject. On the other hand, these individuals had wealth of knowledge to share. Every
participant had something relevant to say, and sometimes informants would go so far as
to mentor me on how to conduct my research and frame my inquiry. They generally
understood the nature of academic research, which also eased the interview process.
Although there were occasionally difficulties of trust, with many informants I was able to
develop great working relationships because of their interest in my research.
Data Collection, Coding, & Reliability
My data consisted of 20 interviews, 3 lectures, extensive secondary source
research, and one day of observation at the Port site. These were the most effective tools
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for me because my research questions did not lend themselves to surveys. My field
research was primarily qualitative, but was complemented by more quantitative
secondary source research. The informants consisted of 7 Cameroonian government
employees,

3

embassy

representatives,

3

NGO

representatives,

3

corporate

representatives, representatives of the IMF and the World Bank, a Port construction
worker, and a professor of politics. Only one of these, a Cameroonian ministry worker,
was a woman. Only in a few cases did informants permit me to record interviews, so
instead I took extensive notes as they spoke. The data is reliable because the research was
based on a combination of opinions and perceptions, which do not need to be checked.
Any facts given were crosschecked with secondary sources.
The interviews were stored by category (Government, NGO, Corporate, etc.) in
my electronic research journal. Following that, each interview was analyzed to extract
important themes and make observations. The themes and observations were noted in a
separate section of the research journal. There were many recurring themes, which made
coding a straightforward process. The data lent itself naturally to analysis, because unlike
raw numbers or survey responses, it was in the form of personal analysis of the subject
done by my informants. My role was to link these ideas with secondary sources to form a
coherent narrative, and finally to analyze that narrative.
Strengths & Limitations of my Research
One limitation of my research was time. There are many stakeholders in the Kribi
Port Project whose insights are not included here. However, given the patterns present in
the responses, it is possible to predict what those additional informants may have
contributed. The more significant limitation of my project was the lack of access to

11
sensitive information about the Port, because it is such an important project for the
government. Due to my major ethical concern – misrepresenting the nature of my
research – participants were always informed of my doubts concerning the efficacy of
Kribi Port project. Although this was necessary because ethical research was of primary
importance in this study, it limited what some informants were willing to share. My final
limitation was language. When interviews were conducted in French, it was sometimes
difficult to formulate questions about the complicated issues the paper addresses. Thus,
responses did not always correspond to the intended question. This was not a huge
obstacle, because it was usually possible to rephrase the question in a comprehensible
manner.
Overall, the strengths of my research were more significant than the limitations.
The first factor that contributed to my success was that the majority of my interviews
were conducted in English. It was easier and more efficient to analyze information given
in English than in French. The supportive and work-conducive environments in both of
my host families also contributed immeasurably to my success. My host parents in
Yaoundé gave me rides to the ministries in the morning, and helped me locate elusive
government offices. My host mother in Kribi was very well connected in the government
and NGO community, and exposed me to obscure and valuable sources. Finally, several
informants were extremely helpful, and went above and beyond what was asked of them.
Several people sent me relevant articles after interviews for further reference, suggested
other possible contacts, and offered to respond to further questions via email. This
superlative level of cooperation made the research process much easier and more
enjoyable.
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III.

Stakeholders and Expectations
The original idea for the Kribi Port Complex was born under the leadership of

Ahidjo, between 1980 and 1982. It remained a peripheral goal for the government until
2005, when the idea was brought to the fore and feasibility studies began. Finally, in
2008 the funding was secured from ExIm Bank, and after almost thirty years the project
became tangible.13 The success of the Cameroon Vision 2035 goals hinges directly on the
success of the Port, which is seen as the linchpin in the government’s effort to develop
Cameroonian infrastructure. Now, as the Port’s projected 2014 opening date nears, the
“selling” stage is in full swing. A round table investment summit is planned for June of
this year, and intended guests include ambassadors and corporate representatives from all
the major Western powers, as well as China and neighboring CEMAC countries. The
expectation is that many parties will be vying for the rights to undertake the infrastructure
projects like the roads and light rail intended to surround the Port. The coordinators also
believe that foreign companies will invest in industrial projects in the vicinity of the Port,
in sectors as diverse as agricultural and electricity. The vision for the Port is not as a
simple entry and exit point for goods, but as a global trade hub, and a new city that will
surpass Douala as the economic capital of the country by 2040.14
When asked how the Kribi Port would be a positive step for the economic
development, the first thing that nearly all of my informants mentioned was the minimal
capacity of the Port of Douala. Those who believe that foreign investment will catalyze
economic growth in Cameroon see the lack of a deep-water port as a major impediment

13
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Nsomotto. Interview. 15 April 2013.
Idem.
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to development. 15 A director in the Ministry of Commerce explained that Cameroon
hopes to replicate the experience of the East Asian “Tigers,” whose maritime-based trade
helped lift them from poverty. Many also cited the fact that the Port will serve an
important purpose for the CEMAC region, particularly for landlocked countries like Chad
and the Central African Republic who need a means of exporting their plentiful raw
materials. Cameroon is the most politically stable country in the region, and the de facto
leader of the CEMAC regional organization. Stakeholders hope that the Port will cement
Cameroon’s leadership role in the region, while bringing investment and positive
externalities to its neighbors as well.
The Port Direction committee hopes that foreign partners will recognize the vast
potential of Kribi as an industrial city, which will generate competition among investors,
and lead to favorable terms of investment. 16 Terms of investment are a key issue in
economic development, and according to a representative in the Yaoundé IMF office,
poorly negotiated terms of trade and investment have been responsible for much of the
economic stagnancy in Cameroon and across Sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF encourages
the government to engage in fastidious cost-benefit analysis before undertaking big
projects with any partners.17 If the draw of the Port can improve Cameroon’s bargaining
capacity with foreign partners, it will serve an important purpose. The Port Direction
Committee also reports that any investments in infrastructure projects surrounding the
Port will be required to be joint ventures with Cameroonian companies.18 It is unclear
how this will transpire given the lack of large-scale enterprise in Cameroon, but joint
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ventures would be a good way to ensure that some revenues stay in the country and a
transfer of technology takes place. Currently the majority of Cameroonian enterprise is
low-skill, low value-added, and in 2005 less than 10% of exports were manufactured
goods. According to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO),
the best way to remedy Cameroon’s negative progress in export performance over the
past several years is through foreign direct investment, which the Port will promote.19
The Cameroonian economy consists of nine principal sectors that contribute to its
GDP: manufacturing, tourism, industry, energy, services, mining, finance, timber, and
agriculture. In order to analyze the cumulative effects that the Port will have on economic
development in Cameroon, one needs to identify which sectors the Port project will have
a measurable effect on. The five sectors that will be most directly affected are Mining,
Energy, Manufacturing, Industry, and Tourism. In the following sections I will delineate
how these sectors will be affected, and analyze whether those effects will contribute
positively or negatively to sustainable economic development.
IV.

Mining Impacts
The Port will impact the mining sector on every level. The Kribi port is designed

as primarily a mineral Port, and there is a terminal specifically for raw minerals, as well
as terminals for aluminum and iron.20 This will reduce costs at every level for importers
and exporters of Cameroonian minerals, encouraging investment in Cameroon’s rich
natural resources.21 Mining currently accounts for only two percent of Cameroon’s GDP,
but many companies are in the early stages of their projects and are just beginning the
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United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Industrial Performance and Capabilities
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Amougou. Interview. 22 April 2013.
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extraction phase, so this percentage is expected to increase considerably in the coming
years. 22 An executive with GeoVic, an American company working in Cameroon,
asserted that the uptick in mining investment has little to do with the Port, and is based on
when they discover minerals and find the investors to starts projects.23 Yet even if causeand-effect is not directly distinguishable, they Port is clearly linked to the mining
industry. Two men I spoke to at the Ministry of Mines noted that the Port has been
crucial in encouraging foreign investment in Cameroonian natural resources, and the
number of companies that have come to invest in mining projects in Cameroon has
increased substantially since the Port began construction.24
This new foreign investment means that the Port will augment revenues in the
mining sector, and increase the percentage of GDP that mining accounts for. This means
an increase in revenues for the state, which typically receives twenty percent of the
mining revenues generated in Cameroon, through taxation and their shares in private
companies.25 Mining revenues will certainly benefit the state, but the question remains
whether or not the mining industry is a good way to promote sustainable economic
development in Cameroon. When I posed this question to a GeoVic executive at the
Yaoundé office, he laughed quietly and did not respond affirmatively. Instead, he
answered with suggestions for how the industry could be improved to make it more
beneficial to the country. He pointed out that the industry is almost exclusively foreigncontrolled, and there are few Cameroonians who have the expertise to work in mining.26
While his response was telling, to gain a general understanding of the economic
22
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development impacts one has to examine three categories: sustainability, employment
opportunities, and revenue destinations.
By their very nature the extractive industries are not sustainable – eventually,
natural resources in Cameroon will run out. Thus, sustainability in the mining sector is
based on the government’s aptitude in long-term financial planning. Revenues need to be
reinvested in sustainable development projects in order for mining to contribute to the
long-term economic development of the country. Although it is impossible to predict how
the revenues will be used, based on previous problems with transparency in the extractive
industries in Cameroon there is reason to doubt that revenues will be saved or invested in
development projects. Money from mining contracts has often been misappropriated in
the past, at both the government and corporate level.27
Cameroon also has notoriously poor communication between ministries, which
makes long term planning difficult. 28 I was told by a director in the Ministry of
Commerce that the Ministry of finance would handle mining revenues, but no one in that
ministry or on the corporate side could tell me how they determine spending priorities for
extractive industry revenues. The lack of communication and transparency in the
government is also an obstacle to the success of the mining sector because of the
resulting issues with overlapping land-use permits. Almost every company dealing with
natural resources in Cameroon has to deal with competing land claims at some point.
This is an obstacle that the government should have addressed before the construction of
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the Port, because it will continue to limit the attractiveness of investing in Cameroon,
despite the convenience of the Port.29
Finally, mining is an industry that is foreign controlled on every level. According
to the executive I spoke with at GeoVic, 50 to 60 percent of revenues ultimately leave
Cameroon. They go back to investors in countries like the United States and Australia,
who are certainly not spending that money in Cameroon. More importantly, mining is
also foreign-dominated in that it employs relatively few Cameroonians, even as compared
to other foreign-controlled industries. While some African countries have legislated for
minimum levels of local participation in foreign companies, Cameroon is not among
them.30 Women in particular are completely shut out of the industry, which is detrimental
for a country that is purportedly trying to better utilize the capacity of the female work
force. 31 The lack of domestic involvement is a significant problem with the industry,
according to the director of GeoVic, a rare Cameroonian for whom mining has provided a
reliable income. He proposes that foreign-owned companies should be required to
contribute to the formation of mining schools in Cameroon, such as the one currently
being formed in Northern Cameroon. He says that the major problem with mining is that
Cameroon lacks engineers that can do skilled work for these companies, let alone start
their own enterprises.32
Thus, it seems that as long as the extractive industries are foreign and state
controlled, they will be neither sustainable, nor good for job creation. The African
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Development Bank has noted that the primary commodity and extractive industries “are
not generating the employment opportunities that would allow the majority of the
population to share in the benefits…This is in marked contrast to the Asian experience,
where the growth of labor-intensive manufacturing has helped lift millions of people out
of poverty.”33 As long as minerals are not transformed in Cameroon, the employment
opportunities that the mining sector generates will be minimal. Although the Vision 2035
goals involve expanding the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, there is no
indication that they have taken steps to develop the skilled workforce and attract the
investment that mineral transformation requires.34
V. Energy, Manufacturing, Industry, and Tourism Impacts
As another branch of the extractive industries, the energy sector faces similar
corruption issues. The Cameroonian national oil refining company SNH is controlled
directly by the executive branch, and is notorious for its lack of transparency. 35 Oil
companies in Cameroon are joint ventures between foreign companies and the stateowned company SONARA. Independently, Cameroon still lacks the ability to add value
to a significant percentage of their raw crude oil. An example of an obstacle to domestic
transformation is the SONARA oil refining plant, built in 1973 in Limbe. It currently
functions at ten percent of capacity, because the refinery was constructed for a type of oil
that Cameroon does not actually have very much of. This means they have to import oil
in order to refine it – not an efficient business model. 36 Thus, it continues to be the
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foreign-operated companies that dominate the oil sector. According to the U.S. embassy,
the presence of the Kribi Port will encourage United States investors to look more closely
at Sub-Saharan Africa as a source of oil. Currently U.S. companies remain hesitant about
Sub-Saharan Africa, while they invest heavily in the Middle East and other regions. The
presence of the Port will encourage them to give Cameroon and the entire CEMAC
region a second look.37 Yet the foreign power who will most obviously benefit from the
Port project is France. Plans have already been made for an industrial park in which the
French company GDF-Suez will work with collaborate with SNH to transform natural
gas into liquefied gas for export. There will be an entire terminal devoted to the export of
liquefied gas, and the government is expecting this project to generate significant
revenue.38
These Port-based projects will contribute to the economic development of the
country, in that growth in the oil sector will bring increased revenues to the state. Oil
production expanded by about nine percent in 2012, due to significant exploration and
increased exploitation of oil resources. Private operators were responsible for the
majority of this increased production. However, the main drivers of economic growth
over the past several years have been in the non-oil economy. Growth in the tertiary
sector is actually estimated to have contributed the most to the expansion of economic
activity. 39 Additionally, the oil industry suffers from the two main problems of the
mining industry; it creates few new jobs compared to secondary and tertiary level

37

Mamadou. Interview. 11 April 2013.
Amougou. Interview. 22 April 2013.
39
World Bank. “Cameroon Economic Update: mitigating poverty, vulnerability, and risk.” Issue
5. January 2013. p. 3.
38

20
industries, and lacks transparency.40 The revenues from oil go straight to the coffers of
the executive branch, and from there are exceedingly difficult to trace. 41 Creating
employment is a major priority for Cameroon at this point, so it is important to diversify
and invest in high-employment industries alongside the low-employment industries like
mining and oil.42
The manufacturing sector will also be affected by the development of the Kribi
Port Complex, but in a slightly different way. One important goal of Vision 2035 is for
manufacturing to eventually account for 23 percent of GDP compared to the current 11
percent.43 Yet the most direct effect on manufacturing will be the influx of cheap goods
from abroad. Several ministry representatives pointed out how lowered transaction costs
would lower the costs of imported goods, and thus increase imports. They cited this as a
benefit of the Port, and a way to lower the cost of living in the country.44 Yet there are
negative side effects of cheap imports, which can already be seen to some extent with the
flood of Chinese goods into Cameroon. 45 First, as many informants pointed out, the
goods coming into the market are low quality, because China maintains different
standards of production for different export markets.46 Cameroonians frequently refer to
something as “Chinese” to insult its quality.
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The second problem is that these goods are sold so cheaply that domestic
Cameroonian manufacturers are put out of business, unable to compete with Chinese
prices. Thus, increased imports will further inhibit Cameroon from developing a diverse
manufacturing base, which is essential to sustainable economic development.47 It is worth
noting that output, employment, and investment in Cameroon all grew more during the
protectionism phase than the liberalization phase. The United Nations Industrial
Organization currently cites competition from imports, weaknesses in output, and
technology acquisition as three major obstacles to Cameroon’s economic success. In
2005, less than ten percent of Cameroon’s exports were manufactured goods.48 While I
am not advocating that Cameroon turn it’s back on the global economy, it does seem
worthwhile for the government to further explore import-substitution possibilities, which
the Port will not promote.
The fourth affected sector is industry – the most obviously linked to the Kribi Port
Complex, which will be an industrial park if all goes as planned. The Port will facilitate
rapid industrialization if the plans for the surrounding infrastructure projects are realized.
The master plan for the Port includes almost every industrial sector than currently exists
in the country, including agro-industry and electricity. Some of these types of
industrialization are more beneficial than others, and ministry representatives in the
Ministry of Mines expressed their hope that the Port would draw in foreign investment in
agro-industry. If this were to happen it could create significant employment opportunities
for Cameroonians, because agro-businesses typically employ more Cameroonians than
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the extractive industries.49 Ultimately, the Port will support the development of industry
in Cameroon, and the percentage of GDP that industry creates will increase.50 This will
be a positive thing for the country if it comes with a transfer of technology and
employment opportunities.
The final affected industry is tourism. Although this is a local level effect, it is
relevant to the national economy because Kribi is one of the most important tourist
destinations in the country. The Port will have significant transformative effects on the
area, planned and unplanned. Kribi and Campo, the towns on either side of the Port, are
projected to grow to about five times their current sizes.51 The Southern Regional director
of the Ministry of Tourism reported that he expects the tourism industry to grow as a
result of the Port’s presence, with the influx of people and international hotel chains. He
explained that the major obstacle to attracting foreign tourists to Kribi is the lack of
world-class hotels. Instead there are many small hotels that do not meet Western
standards.
However, he also emphasized ecotourism as the future of tourism in the region.
He explained that they are in the process of establishing host structures in villages and
Bagyeli camps so that tourists can experience traditional life. 52 This is problematic,
because the Port is in fact displacing many of these local people and destroying their
villages. The Port will certainly bring in more people, more money, and thus more need
for leisure activities. Tourism will increase, but it is not likely to be in the ecotourism
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direction.53 Statistics released by the ministry of economy show that 5,000 people have
already been forced from their homes, and according to the current plan the Port complex
will use at least 27,000 hectares of forestland. This is not only an environmental but also
an economic impact, because as one of Kribi’s two mayors Sabikanda Guy Emmanuel
pointed out “the disappearance of our forest means losing out on an important part of
revenue from logging for our council budget, especially in the short run, and this is quite
disturbing.”54 The goal of ecotourism is to mitigate the impacts of tourism on the land
and local people, while the presence of the Port will increase the impacts on the land and
the people. Additionally, to date no official environmental impact assessment has been
done, because of the government’s desire to start the project as quickly as possible.55
Environmentalist Eric Bisil of the CED pointed out that this fact alone could support the
argument that it is too early for the Port project to be undertaken.56
V.

Effects on CEMAC
When addressing the economic development effects of the Kribi Port on the CEMAC

regional group, I have to qualify my analysis by explaining my view on regional
economic groups. I believe that developing countries should adhere to the structuralist
theory of how to equalize North-South trade. This would involve instituting higher tariffs
while they develop the weak areas of their economies. This kind of import-substituting
development, along with increased intra- regional trade, is the best solution to their
current inability to compete on the global market. Instead of competing with the highly
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subsidized farmers and cheap imports from abroad, they would be competing and trading
with their neighbors who have more similar means of production and government
funding. Developing countries that have already increased intraregional trade through
successful agreements are faring better with free trade than their counterparts who rely on
Northern markets.57 This theory is in line with what Kenichi Ohmae posits in “The End
of the Nation State,” where he writes that the focus of economic development should be
shifted “away from nations and back toward regions.” 58 However, I am not alone in
placing great importance on regional trade. The Vision 2035 goals also note the
importance of increased regional and sub-regional exchange.59
CEMAC is already a well-integrated regional group in some ways, given that they
share a common currency and a central bank (BEAC). The principal challenges to further
integration are posed by the instability and poverty that are present in several member
states, notably Chad and the Central African Republic. This leads to a lack of
infrastructure in those states that inhibits intraregional exchange.60 The Kribi Port will be
an important addition to the infrastructure of all CEMAC countries, because they will all
use it. Even nearby Equatorial Guinea, who does not currently use the Port of Douala, has
sent an emissary to look into securing access to the Deep Sea Port. These countries will
benefit from easier access to foreign markets via the Port, particularly in the case of
landlocked CEMAC member states like Chad and the CAR. This will raise the global
profile of the CEMAC region, and create new trade relationships between member states
and foreign partners. However, because the Port will emphasize global connections and
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raw material exports, it may direct attention away from regional exchange. This would
continue the current economic trend in the region, of increasing dependence on mineral
exports and decreasing capacity to export industrial products.61 However according the
US embassy representative this is not necessarily a bad thing, because it is important to
maintain diverse trade strategies.62
The most significant positive regional effect of the Port is the potential positive
externalities that it may bring. While these cannot be predicated with complete accuracy,
one can look to history to extrapolate how things may unfold. One important example is
Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. There were many clear drawbacks to this project, but one
positive outcome is often overlooked: the construction of a high bandwidth fiber-optic
cable that runs along the Pipeline, giving Chad internet access to a degree that would
have been impossible otherwise, and linking Chad to Cameroon.63 As I mentioned, one of
the biggest challenges facing CEMAC is the lack of intraregional transportation
infrastructure. Roads and railways will likely be built in order for countries to transport
their goods to the Kribi Port, because foreign companies will be willing to invest in
infrastructure to increase trade efficiency.64 Although the goal of these routes will be to
transport goods for export, these new transport routes could also potentially increase
intraregional trade and connections, which would be very beneficial to the Cameroonian
economy.
Finally, the access to a world-class seaport will potentially allow the CEMAC
countries to boost their economies through foreign investment and create new
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employment. One thing that some scholars criticize about CEMAC is that the region
lacks free movement of labor. However, this is a case where an economic principle that
applies to many regions does not make sense. With huge unemployment rates in most
CEMAC countries, it is naïve to expect that allowing jobless people into other countries
that lack jobs would stimulate the economy. However, if the Port can encourage
investment and employment in Cameroon’s neighbors, it could boost their economies
enough so that eventually free flow of labor in CEMAC may be a viable option. This
would strengthen the regional economy in a sustainable manner. Ultimately, the potential
benefits to the CEMAC region are some of the most important benefits that the Port will
bring, if they are harnessed effectively.
VI.

The Cameroon – China Partnership
The Kribi Port Complex will impact Cameroon’s relationships with its foreign

partners, namely China, France, and the United States. They question is, do their interests
align with Cameroon to create truly “gagnant-gagnant” partnerships? Or is there a point
at which the interests of these industrial giants are at odds with those of Cameroon; a
country where human development indicators have remained largely stagnant despite
decades of aid and investment from the West. Representatives from all three governments
have confirmed that the Kribi Port will promote greater involvement between Cameroon
and these countries, but the partner mostly directly linked to the project is China.
China has a clear stake in the Port and what it will bring for their relationship,
because it is a Chinese state-owned company that designed and built the Port.65 They also
have a long trading history with Cameroon. In 2002, the Agreement for Economic and
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Commercial Cooperation codified the existing preferential trade relationship between
Cameroon and China. The volume of trade between them had been steadily increasing
since 1995, but rose markedly after the 2002 agreement and shot up to a new level in
2008 when Cameroon began exporting more oil to China. Their trade relationship is
reminiscent of colonialism in that Cameroon exports raw materials like oil, wood, and
cotton, and imports primarily manufactured goods such as vehicles, clothing, and leather
products. 66 China’s significant investment in Africa is part of their “going global”
strategy, which began in 1988 when they started establishing special economic zones
around the world, after 20 years of focusing on bringing foreign investment into China.
The goal was to find new markets for Chinese goods and services, gain access to raw
materials, and increase their global political power.67 African countries comprise a large
voting bloc in settings like the United Nations, which makes them beneficial allies for
China. A secondary goal of “going global” was to circumvent the restrictions that some
states have on Chinese exports by producing goods in other countries and exporting from
there. These economic benefits are part of the reason why China has “generously”
cancelled 66 million USD of Cameroonian debt to China over the past 15 years.68
The question of why countries like Cameroon accept this seemingly colonial trade
relationship has a fairly straightforward answer. Unlike the Western states and
organizations that offer conditional aid and investment, China does not care about the
political practices of its trading partners. This makes it a perfect trading partner for
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autocratic presidents like Paul Biya, who are looking to legitimize their regimes through
mega-projects that China is willing to finance. Biya can justify the partnership to the
public because it has socio-historical roots. Whereas Western involvement in the
continent is often seen as neo-colonial and paternalistic, China refers to itself as “the
world’s largest developing country”69 and has never tried to impose cultural or political
norms on African states. China even helped finance some of the nationalist wars of
liberation in the 1960s.70
Given the history of their relationship, the fact that China was invited to construct
the Kribi Port Complex is not surprising. However, what is more interesting is that
France was originally intended to provide the funds, and a French company was set to
design the Port. A French company had even drawn up initial plans for the Port –
Cameroon was willing to put aside any resentment of their former colonizer to
collaborate on the project. However, all of this changed with the global financial crisis in
2008. Almost overnight, it became very difficult to procure funds in the Western world.
France had to back out of the project, leaving Cameroon to turn to China, who remained
largely unscathed by the financial collapse. China was eager to step in. Cameroon
negotiated a 207 billion CFA concessionary loan with the Export-Import (Exim) Bank for
the project, and the bank designated CHEC, a state-owned company, for the design and
construction of the Port.
This begs the question: given the history of China’s presence in Cameroon, how
will their increasing links with the country impact sustainable economic development?
According to the Chinese embassy in Cameroon, the Port will not directly affect their
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trade relationship, except by making it easier for Cameroon to export commodities. As
the representative pointed out, they are already engaged in a high level of trade, even
without the Port, and they plan to continue to exchange the same types of goods. The
significant change in their relationship will not be in terms of trade, but in the level of
Chinese involvement and investment in Cameroonian infrastructure. The embassy
confirmed that the same company who is building the port, CHEC, hopes to win the
contract to manage the Port, as well as to build the roads and railways that are planned to
link it to major cities and extraction sites. If China succeeds in securing these contracts,
they will far surpass any other investor in their level of investment in Cameroon.71 These
investments will certainly contribute to the creation of more sophisticated infrastructure
in Cameroon, which will contribute to the country’s “Doing Business” ranking,
something several informants mentioned as an important consequence of the Port.72
Many people I spoke to, from Cameroonian bureaucrats to corporate
representatives, have pointed out that just like any trade partner, China is driven by it’s
own interests. It would be a mistake to perceive their relationship with Cameroon as
anything like a friendship.73 So what makes this trade relationship better or worse than
any other? First, China is notorious for bringing in their own workers for their projects
abroad. The Chinese embassy representative responded to this by saying that while they
were doing their utmost to hire more Cameroonians, the lack of skilled labor in
Cameroon often hindered their efforts.74 This means that very little transfer of technology
takes place, which the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
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representative cited as one of the most important factors in promoting sustainable
economic development. While Cameroon needs financial investment, he pointed out that
what are more important are long-term technological investments.75 History suggests that
the Chinese are not going to be the ones to do this. An article in the China Daily pointed
out that a benefit of doing business in Cameroon is that they have “an investment charter
that allows investors to repatriate profits.”76 In this case, it appears that China intends to
repatriate both the literal and figurative profits. Not only will they earn direct revenues
from their projects, but their workforce will also gain skills and experience that they can
bring back to China. According to Lamido Sanusi, governor of the Central Bank of
Nigeria, China is “a significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialization and
underdevelopment,” and Africa “must encourage a shift from consuming Chinese-made
goods to making and consuming our own.”77 For Cameroon, the ultimate goal of foreign
investment is for Cameroonians to eventually gain the skills and technology needed to
coordinate something like the Kribi Port project domestically; it is worth noting that this
remains a distant dream despite over a decade of heavy Chinese investment in the
country.78
VII.

Personal Analysis and Predictions

As readers may have ascertained, I have many reservations about the Kribi Deep Sea
Port project. The project first appeared to be a demonstration and reinforcement of
President Paul Biya’s personal power. The Port is being built in the region where he
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holds the most power,79 and his face is all over the “grands realisations” posters in every
ministry. It is no doubt an impressive feat orchestrating the construction of a multimillion dollar Port, thus it seemed like a natural tool to reinforce his power. Yet it has
become clear that it is much more than that. In fact, almost all my informants at every
level – government, corporate, and NGO – believe that it will be a positive step for the
economy. There will certainly be economic benefits for many actors involved. However,
I believe the project has been undertaken prematurely. It strikes me as an example of
Rene Dumond’s argument in his book L’Afrique noir est mal parti: a developing country
skipping the necessary steps of development and moving straight to large-scale
industrialization. There as several development steps that need to be taken in Cameroon
before the full benefits of a project like the Port can be reaped. Under the current
circumstances, the natural resource wealth of Cameroon will be used up before there are
mechanisms in place to ensure that its benefits go to the Cameroonian people.
The first obstacle is the lack of an adequately educated workforce. Engineers, doctors,
and scientists are in short supply in Cameroon, and these are the professions that drive
industry. The Port project will bring in foreign investment and foreign companies that
will theoretically engage in joint ventures with Cameroonians, but it is unclear how this
will be logistically possible given the lack of Cameroonians available to fulfill roles
requiring technical skills. Cameroon currently ranks 63rd of a list of 74 developing
countries in terms of the intensity of technical skill development in the country. In the
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same sample they rank in the bottom ten countries in the percentage of their industries
that are medium or high tech as opposed to resource-based. 80
Even the Kribi Port project steering committee admitted that at least in the first few
years, the lack of skilled Cameroonian workers would be a problem. Their belief is that
the government will realize this problem and invest in educational infrastructure, and
high-tech skill creation in particular.81 Yet even if this is the case, this is evidence of the
premature nature of the project; it will create jobs before there are workers who can fill
them. Economist Dambisa Moyo notes that foreign direct investors looking to have a
long term presence in a country seek out governments that are “keen on investing in their
infrastructure…notably education.” 82 Thus, the lack of initiative the government has
shown in the area of education could even deter the foreign investment that the Port is
meant to attract. As far as the assertion that the government will address the problem of
inadequate education structures, one informant pointed out that the Port project was
conceived of over 30 years ago, in which time the government could have, but has not,
put in place any measures to increase professional skill creation.83
The lack of educated Cameroonians to fill these professional jobs is detrimental at
two levels. Not only do Cameroonians miss out on employment opportunities, but it
means that companies will have to bring in workers from abroad. These skilled
professionals will come with purchasing power, leading prices for basic commodities to
increase.84 Several ministry workers cited a reduced cost of living as a positive impact of
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the Port, because of the associated reduction in import costs.85 Yet due to the negative
externality associated with the influx of foreign labor, the Port may have the opposite
effect. Rather than making goods affordable, it will further the divide between those who
can keep up with the increase in prices and those who cannot. The rich and educated
population will get richer and benefit from new jobs, while the uneducated will be
excluded from the economy – what amounts to a condemnation of the poor.86
The second reason why the Port is a premature project is that the inconvenience of
having a sub-optimal Port is not as significant as many of the economic development
challenges in Cameroon. Business executives operating in Cameroon, both Cameroonian
and foreign, tend to agree. In a 2010 study, executives were asked to make a list of the
most important obstacles to doing business in the country. The four most commonly
listed were fiscal regulation (59%), corruption (50%), access to credit (38%), and
administrative formalities (36%). Transportation and infrastructure were both listed by
less than twenty percent of respondents.87 This suggests that the Port, which is designed
to benefit corporate interests, does not actually address their current priorities.
Additionally, in a 2009 study on obstacles to doing business, executives from the mining
and oil sectors cited the fewest number of obstacles, and the greatest ease of operations.88
It appears that they are already faring better in the country than other enterprises already,
yet they are the ones who will reap the majority of the benefits from this project.
My third hesitation is that the Port will not encourage diversification, both in terms of
trade relationships and domestic economic development. Investing so much in the
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relationship with China is risky, because according to the World Bank there is a
possibility of an abrupt downturn in Chinese demand and “a disorderly unwinding of
China’s unusually high investment rate.” If CHEC does, as they expect to, win the
contracts for developing the infrastructure for the entire Port Industrial Complex,
Cameroon will be hugely indebted and indelibly linked to China. If China suddenly
demands the repayment of a loan, or even stops forgiving loans to Cameroon as regularly
as it has in the past, it could be a huge blow to Cameroon. These problems are not only
specific to China – agreeing to long term spending commitments is a risky endeavor for a
commodity-exporting country like Cameroon, given the volatility of the global market.
The specific problem with the Chinese partnership is the lack of transfer of
technology. Even if my informants had not raised this issue time and time again, it would
have been apparent to me upon visiting the Port worksite. The evidence of segregation
was glaring. On one side of the construction site, there are the Chinese dorms. In this area
there is a soccer field, basketball courts, and roughly an acre devoted to the growing of
Chinese produce. The signage was almost exclusively in Chinese. On the other side of the
site, there are the dorms for the Cameroonian workers. They do not eat in the Chinese
cafeteria, and frequent small bars and roadside establishments instead. Several workers
reported in informal conversations that they rarely talk to the Chinese workers, even at
work. They explained that they have different responsibilities, the Chinese working every
day, while the Cameroonians are called in for physical labor. When asked if they had
learned any skills or understood how the project was being directed, they replied that they
learned how to operate some different machinery but were not privy to the details of the
project. One expressed the belief that after the Port was completed, the Chinese would
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leave and Cameroonians would run it. 89 I did not correct him, but according to the
Cameroonian government this will not be the case. When their two-year contract
expires,90 these laborers will have to start again from square one. Economist Dambisa
Moyo, along with many others, cites job creation and technology transfer as the two
biggest benefits of foreign direct investment. 91 In their relationship with China,
Cameroon is not deriving either of these benefits.
Finally, the most significant reason why the Port is a premature project will come as
no surprise to anyone familiar with Cameroonian politics: the lack of transparency. My
government contacts unfailingly referred me to some other ministry or individual when
asked how Port revenues would be used to promote the development of the country.
When asked whether corruption would be a problem with the new influx of revenues to
state, their replies ranged from laughter to explanations of how corruption was being
combatted. No one offered a hint of where the money was headed, and no one assured me
that this time it would get there. Cameroon has never suffered particularly economically,
and GDP has been growing steadily over the past five years (if not quite as fast as other
oil-producing nations). The figures that remain startlingly stagnant are the human
development indicators, which have never corresponded to national income.92
It is commonly accepted that corruption is to blame. Public health is a good example.
Cameroon spends USD 61 per capita per year on health, yet has the indicators of a
country spending around USD 10 to 15 per capita per year. In a 2009 budget-tracking
exercise by the World Bank, they found that 35-40 percent of funds allocated for local
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health units never reached their intended recipients. These are disheartening figures, and
no amount of natural resource extraction and exportation can create honest politicians.
The incredible centralization of the state, combined with a weak system of checks and
balances, makes it easy to skim money off the top. The administration lacks the capacity
to regulate and monitor mining activities, and no system for tracing mining revenues
currently exists.93 The danger of the Port is that bringing in all this foreign investment
now means that resource wealth may be exhausted whilst Cameroon still suffers from
rampant corruption, and Cameroon will be left with nothing to show for its natural gifts.
Even if direct embezzlement does not take place, the lack of bureaucratic
transparency means that ministries are not required to publicly specify where funds are
going, or create long-term spending plans. This is of the utmost importance with revenues
from natural resources. Yet the kind of collaboration that responsible financial planning
requires has not been demonstrated by the Cameroonian government. Even among those
working in ministries, there is a sense of apathy about the destination of the revenues
from Port-related projects. When asked about what the revenues might be used for, two
young men in the ministry of Mines indicated that they would not see any impacts
because they were too low in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 94 Another informant in the
Regional Commerce ministry in Kribi indicated that he had very little information about
the Port and how it might impact the local economy or local development.95 These were
striking comments, and led me to wonder, if these men working in the government will
not feel the effects of the revenues, how will the 30 percent of Cameroonians living in
poverty feel the effects? In my opinion, it is too early to undertake a project like this
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when the only visible changes one can expect are a few more Prados appearing in the
driveways of recently constructed mansions.
IX. Conclusion
The Kribi Deep Sea Port and resulting investments will inject more money into the
Cameroonian economy, and create new opportunities for employment and regional
integration. These are positive impacts, and the project is not ill conceived. For many
countries it would be extremely beneficial, and if the development of the relevant sectors
is handled efficiently and transparently, the government increases education funding to
prepare more Cameroonians for professional employment, and the increasing regional
links are effectively exploited it could certainly help Cameroon combat poverty.
However, in the current political environment these positive impacts are not likely to be
realized.
The objective of this paper was to answer two questions. First:
1. Will the Kribi Deep Sea Port contribute positively to sustainable economic
development in Cameroon?
My original hypothesis was: The Port will bring increased revenues to the state, and
provide some employment, but ultimately will not create sustainable development. The
Port project will focus the economy on sectors that are infamously corrupt and
unsustainable, thus most Cameroonian citizens are unlikely to feel the effects of the
revenues it generates.
My research has led to me to confirm this hypothesis, yet for different reasons
than those provided. I no longer believe that the extractive industries are inherently
unsustainable, because they wealth they provide can be invested in sustainable
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development projects. The chief reasons why I have confirmed this hypothesis are
detailed in the preceding section: government corruption, poor coordination and longterm planning in the government, the lack of technology transfer in Chinese investment,
and the lack of an appropriate professional education infrastructure in Cameroon, which
means that new employment opportunities will widen the gap between rich and poor.
The second question I sought to answer was:
2. How will the Kribi Deep Sea Port project impact Cameroon’s trade
relationships with CEMAC countries and foreign partners?
My original hypothesis was: Relationships among the CEMAC countries will be largely
unchanged, because although they will all use the Port, the focus will be on exporting
their goods abroad, not trading with one another. The Port will give China and the United
States the opportunity to exploit Cameroonian resources more easily, while contributing
comparatively little to the domestic economy.
My research has led me to reject my hypothesis regarding this question. While
relationships among CEMAC countries may be initially unchanged, I think that the
increases in the global profile, wealth, and infrastructure of the region will lead to
increased links between its member states. They will certainly be exporting their goods
abroad, but prior to my research I had not considered the potential positive externalities
of this trade. As regards the exploitation of resources, I do not think this will be a major
detrimental effect of the Port. Extraction of natural resources in Cameroon would occur
with or without the Port; the Chad-Cameroon pipeline would still be in use, and foreign
companies would still direct mining operations in the country. The Port will facilitate
exploitation, but will not change the dynamics of those sectors significantly.
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The major impact the Port will have on Cameroon’s foreign partnerships is to
encourage investment in the country. It is likely that more American companies,
particularly in the oil sector, will invest in Cameroon. China, as described above, will
become an even bigger player in the Cameroonian economy. The specific effects of these
increased links are impossible to determine, but it is clear that for Cameroon to derive
benefits from these relationships, the most important thing is their capacity to effectively
negotiate the terms of trade. China, the United States, and Europe, are looking at
Cameroon not as a charity case, but as a means to serve their own interests. The
Cameroonian government must determine where overlapping points of interest lie.
Finally, while there is adequate information to accept and reject, respectively, my
hypotheses, none of the predictions given here can be taken as fact. The predictions are
based on an analysis of the facts, the historical precedents, and the various accounts of
Port stakeholders – yet this does not mean that circumstances cannot change. I can only
hope that the many intelligent and energetic people who have contributed to my research
will devote some part of their energies to disproving my findings, and ensuring that the
Port is a success felt by all Cameroonians. It may be rife with obstacles, but it is not a lost
cause.
There are some things that will certainly be lost to history: the town of Kribi, and
the incredible human and animal diversity of the immediate Port region. No matter how
rich the country becomes, these are things that cannot be retrieved. It is partly because of
this significant loss that the success of the Port project is so important. Cameroon is
paying a high price by giving up this part of its beauty and heritage, so it is vital that the
benefits to the country are made to outweigh the substantial costs it is incurring.
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Appendix A: Contacts
1. Eric Bisil, CED extractive industries: ebisil@CED.org
2. Santiago Ormeno, UNIDO: Santiago.ormeno@gmail.com
3. Daline-Louise NSOMOTTO, Port direction committee Yaoundé.
dnsomotto@kribiport.cm ; 99.91.87.80
4. Roland AMOUGOU, Port Direction committe in Kribi: 77.11.88.75; 77.18.67.48
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
US Embassy
Will the Port be a positive step for Cameroonian economic development?
Does the United States hope to benefit from the use of the Port? If so, for what purposes?
How will the Port affect the relationship between the United States and Cameroon, if at all?
Did the US offer a loan to build the port? Why or why not?
Ministry of Commerce
Comment est-ce que le Port va changer les systèmes d’échange dans la région et le monde?
Est-ce que le Port va changer les relations entre Cameroun et ses partenaires d’échanges?
Quels produits seront les exports primaires du Port?
Quels produits seront les imports primaires?
Quels pays étrangers vont utiliser le Port?
Quels seront les destinations pour les revenues qui sont crées par ces nouveaux échanges?
Comment est-ce que l’échange va affecter les industries domestiques? Par exemple les industries
extractive, et l’industrialisation?
Louis Berger
What does your company do?
How did the project get started, what was the process of recruiting companies like? How did your
company get chosen?
GeoVic
What does your company do?
Roughly what percentage of the employees in Cameroon are Cameroonian?
Are most mining companies in Cameroon based in other countries?
Do you think the Kribi Port will affect your business at all? If so, how?
Is the Port an incentive for mining companies to expand or for investors to come to Cameroon?
Does the government support the mining industries in Cameroon? How?
So how much of the revenue leaves the country?
Is mining a good industry to invest in for the economic development between Cameroon?
People often talk about the lack of transparency in the extractive industries – what exactly does
that mean?
I’ve read some things about overlapping land-use permits being an issue? Has your company
faced this?
Chinese Embassy
How will the Port benefit Cameroon and China, and their trade relationship?
Is CHEC, the company constructing the Port, state-owned?
What does China hope for the future of their relationship with Cameroon?
What does China hope to export to Cameroon using the port?
What does China hope to import from Cameroon using the port?
How did the idea for the Port originate?
Do you know how and when Cameroon is planning to pay back the loan to ExIm Bank?
Why Cameroon?
General Interview Questions: used in multiple interviews
What does your office/organization/ministry do in Cameroon?
Have your offices had any role, or done any advising, on the Port project?
Do you think the Port will be a good thing for economic development in Cameroon? Why or why
not?
Do you think focusing on the extractive industries is a good way to promote economic
development in the country?
Do you think the Port will increase China’s influence in the country? If so, is this a good or a bad
thing?
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Where will the revenues be directed?
What is your personal opinion about the Port project?
Is the Port meant to promote regional exchange between CEMAC countries, or to focus on trade
with external powers like China and the U.S?
Which companies will be spearheading the surrounding infrastructure and industrial projects?
(agro, electronic, roads etc.)
How will the Port impact the mining and oil sectors?
How will the Port impact tourism in Kribi?
Will ordinary Cameroonians, including those living in poverty, feel the benefits of the Port?
Who will benefit the most from the Port?

